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UNION DECLINE AND LABOR REVIVAL IN THE  
21ST CENTURY UNITED STATES 
RUTH MILKMAN
The size and influence of organized labor in the United States has 
been declining steadily for more than half a century. The relentless down-
ward trend in union density (defined as the proportion of wage and salary 
workers who are union members) began in the late 1950s and accelerated 
with the systematic dismantling of New Deal era reforms after the neolib-
eral turn of the 1970s.  Two aspects of that dismantling were especially 
impactful.  First, deregulation weakened or eliminated unions in key sec-
tors of the economy, most notably transportation and communication.1
Secondly, employers undertook a concerted effort to eviscerate the 1935 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the bedrock legislation that guaran-
tees workers the right to unionize and to bargain collectively, along with 
the government agency that administers and enforces it, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB).2 In the same period, employers increasingly act-
ed to undermine unions directly, while outsourcing and technological 
change drastically reduced the size of the manufacturing sector, undermin-
ing the industrial unions that comprised the vital center of the labor upsurge 
that occurred during the New Deal years.3
As a result of these and related developments, by the early 21st centu-
ry, union density had returned to pre-New Deal levels, as Figure 1 shows.  
In 2018, only 10.5% of all wage and salary workers, and 6.4% of those in 
the private sector, were union members, down from the mid-20th century 
peak of about 35%.  In contrast, public-sector unionization rates rose in the 
1970s, and have not been significantly reduced since then, although the 
 1.  STEPHEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN, WORKED UP: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
AMERICAN LABOR 142-44 (2019); Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unioniza-
tion, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 335, 349-50 (2005). 
 2.  Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline of Un-
ionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519 (2001); see Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Mal-
amud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and 
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013 (2009). 
 3.  Ryan Nunn, Jimmy O’Donnell & Jay Shambaugh, The Shift in Private Sector Union Partici-






      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 141 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
11 MILKMAN MACRO 2 WB EDIT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 11:16 PM 
274 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
effects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 Janus decision may change that 
in the coming years.4
Figure 1.  Union Density in the United States, 1880-2018.5
Private-sector unions not only suffered membership decline in the late 
20th and early 21st century, but also lost power and leverage.6  One indicator 
of this is the precipitous fall in the frequency of strikes, shown in Figure 2.  
During the 1970s, the average annual number of U.S. work stoppages in-
volving one thousand or more workers (including both strikes and lock-
outs) was 288; by the 1990s it had plummeted to thirty-five.  Even in 2018, 
when the number of workers involved in strikes surged, there were only 
twenty such stoppages (including that year’s big teachers’ strikes).7
The data in Figure 2 actually understate the decline in strikes because 
they include employer-initiated events.  Starting in the 1980s, many em-
ployers deliberately provoked strikes among long-unionized workers to 
extract concessions; lockouts also became increasingly common.8 Moreo-
ver, employers increasingly hired “permanent replacements” for strikers in 
this period, a practice that had been relatively rare (although not illegal) in 
the postwar years.9
 4.  138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 5.  Nunn et al, supra note 3, at 3.  
 6.  See GREENHOUSE, supra note 1, at 137-65. 
 7.  U.S. Bureau Lab. Stats., 20 Major Work Stoppages in 2018 Involving 485,000 Workers, U.S.
DEP’T LAB. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/20-major-work-stoppages-in-2018-
involving-485000-workers.htm [https://perma.cc/ZRN8-MWKA]. 
 8.  Josh Eidelson, The Employer Strikes Back, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://prospect.org/article/employer-strikes-back [https://perma.cc/2VXE-68U6]. 
 9.  See generally Michael LeRoy, The Changing Character of Strikes Involving Permanent 
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A series of high-profile union revitalization efforts in the 1990s and 
early 2000s briefly slowed, but failed to reverse, the long-term density 
decline.  Yet the U.S. labor movement refuses to die.  Experimentation 
with non-union forms of labor organizing – what some label “alt-labor” – 
has proliferated since the 1990s, along with legislative efforts to improve 
wages and working conditions.10 More recently, a variety of new union 
organizing campaigns, some of which involve young, college-educated 
workers, emerged in the aftermath of the Great Recession.  In addition, a 
wave of strikes among hotel workers, auto workers, and teachers in 2018 
and 2019 defied the decades-long decline in work stoppages shown in Fig-
ure 2.  As well, public concern about the nation’s skyrocketing level of 
income inequality, a phenomenon directly linked to de-unionization, helped 
drive rising approval of labor unions in this period.11
Figure 2.  Workers Involved in Work Stoppages involving 1,000 or 
more workers, 1947-2018.12
Not only density levels, but also other features of the political and 
economic context in the 21st century, are strikingly similar to those in the 
era preceding the New Deal reforms of the 1930s.  In retrospect, the 1935-
 10.  Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), https://prospect.org/notebook/alt-
labor/ [https://perma.cc/2TFA-4WXW]. 
 11.  Jeffrey M. Jones, As Labor Day Turns 125, Union Approval Near 50 Year High, GALLUP 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/265916/labor-day-turns-125-union-approval-near-
year-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/3CXF-5SQA]. 
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1975 period appears as an exceptional era of extensive government regula-
tion, compressed inequality, and strong unionism.13  With the return to 
normalcy after the mid-1970s, the labor movement also returned to strate-
gic repertoires from the pre-New Deal era.  Unions with roots in the late 
19th and early 20th century gained an advantage over those that had taken 
shape alongside the reforms of the 1930s.  At the same time, the “alt-labor” 
movement of worker centers that emerged in the 1990s recapitulated many 
of the practices of early 20th century settlement houses and labor reform 
organizations.  In addition, the declining ability of organized labor to win 
improvements through collective bargaining sparked legislative campaigns 
and referenda to raise the legal minimum wage and win other worker pro-
tections at the local and state level, many of which resemble Progressive-
era efforts to win protective legislation.14  Similarly, “wage boards,” a 
regulatory mechanism first created at the state level in the pre-New Deal 
years that faded into disuse during the mid-20th century period of peak un-
ion strength, have been revived, notably in New York and California.  
Comprised of employer, labor and public representatives, the boards set 
minimum wages and labor standards for specific industries, in a form of 
“sectoral bargaining” that has attracted growing interest in the 2010s. 
I. THE DYNAMICS OF UNIONISM IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA
After two decades of steady growth, union density began to fall in the 
late 1950s, a trend often attributed to the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
Act amendments that weakened the NLRA.15 The decline was gradual at 
first, but then accelerated sharply starting in the 1970s.  President Ronald 
Reagan’s draconian response to the 1981 air controllers’ strike added to its 
momentum, although as Figure 1 shows, the erosion of union density began 
well before that pivotal event.16
The post-1981 decline was almost exclusively a private-sector phe-
nomenon.  As Figure 3 shows, public-sector unionism expanded in the 
1970s and remained stable thereafter.  In 2018, 33.9% of public-sector 
workers were union members, compared to only 6.4% of those in the pri-
 13.  See JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION: THE NEW DEAL AND THE LIMITS OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2016) (arguing that the periods before 1935 and after 1975 are more typical for 
the United States). 
 14.  JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM
34-35 (2006) [hereinafter FINE, WORKER CENTERS]. 
 15.  See Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 763-90
(1998).  
 16.  LANE WINDHAM, KNOCKING ON LABOR’S DOOR: UNION ORGANIZING IN THE 1970S AND THE 
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vate sector.  Employer opposition to unions was minimal in the public sec-
tor, whereas it became increasingly effective in the private sector in this 
period.17
Figure 3.  Public- and Private-Sector Union Density in the United 
States, 1973-2018.18
The disproportionate growth of organized labor in the public sector 
contributed to a major transformation in the demographic composition of 
union membership, especially in regard to gender.  In 1970, women were 
only 20.7% of U.S union members; by 2018, their share had grown to 
45.2%.19  That was the result not only of expanded female labor force par-
ticipation over that period, but also of the extensive unionization of female-
dominated occupations in the public sector.  The growth of public-sector 
unionism also had a racial dimension.  In 1983, African Americans were 
13.7% of the nation’s union members; by 2018 their share had increased 
slightly, to 15.3%.  There had been a steep decline in African American 
union membership in manufacturing in the intervening years, but that was 
more than counterbalanced by the growth of public-sector unions, as a re-
sult of the substantial overrepresentation of African Americans in govern-
ment employment.20
In a related shift, the average educational level of union members has 
increased even more rapidly than that of the population as a whole over the 
 17.  Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private Sector and 
Public Sector Unionism in the United States 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 63, 79 (1988). 
 18.  Nunn et al., supra note 3, at 4. 
 19.  U.S. DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. STATS., BULL. NO. 2079, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS 
AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979 (1980); Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson, Union Mem-
bership and Earnings Data Book, BLOOMBERG L. BUREAU NAT’L AFF. 29 (2019). 
 20.  Cherrie Bucknor, Black Workers, Unions and Inequality, CTR FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. (Aug. 
2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/black-workers-unions-2016-08.pdf?v=2; Hirsch & Mac-
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past half-century.  In the mid-20th century, when blue-collar workers were 
highly unionized and prior to the surge of public-sector organizing, most 
union members had a high school education or less.21 But in 2018, the 
unionization rate of college graduates (11.9%) exceeded that of high school 
graduates (10.1%).22  That reflected not only the expansion of higher edu-
cation generally, but also the divergence between private- and public-sector 
union density, since public-sector workers (for example, teachers, the larg-
est single group) are disproportionately college-educated. 
In the private sector, growing managerial resistance to unionism start-
ing in the late 1970s was the key driver of density decline.  That resistance 
was manifested in a sharp rise in illegal firings of workers during union 
campaigns for NLRB representation elections, shown in Figure 4.  This 
trend mirrors the decline in strike frequency (Figure 2), emerging in the late 
1970s and increasing sharply in the early 1980s.23
Figure 4.  Probability Pro-Union Worker is Fired during a Union 
Election Campaign, 1951-2007.24
Firing pro-union workers is explicitly prohibited by the NLRA, but it be-
came a routine practice in this period.  Fines for violations are modest, as is 
the likelihood of employers incurring them; such penalties gradually came 
 21. Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and Inequality 
Over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data 16 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations 
Section, Working Paper No. 620, 2018), https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01 
gx41mm54w/3/620.pdf.  
 22.  Hirsch & MacPherson, supra note 19. For 1996-2000 and 2001-07, the unshaded portion of 
the data bar represents non-NLRB elections. 
 23. John Schmitt & Ben Zipperer, Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election 
Campaigns, 1951-2007, CTR FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 10 (Jan. 2007), http://cepr.net/documents/pub 
lications/dropping-the-ax-update-2009-03.pdf. 
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to be seen as a “cost of doing business.”  Employers also deployed various 
legal tactics to resist unions in this period, hiring anti-union consultants, 
taking steps to delay representation elections, and subjecting workers to 
anti-union speech on company time.25  Among other effects, this led to a 
precipitous drop in the share of the workforce made up of newly organized 
workers.  From 1950 to 1954, unions organized 1.3% of the labor force 
each year through NLRB elections; twenty years later the figure was only 
0.4%, and from 1985 to 1988, only 0.1%.26
Organizing – or actively recruiting new members into the ranks of or-
ganized labor – is the primary way in which unions themselves can in-
crease density.  But it is also shaped by a variety other forces entirely 
beyond the labor movement’s control.  For example, all else being equal, if 
employment declines in a highly unionized sector of the economy or ex-
pands in a non-union (or weakly unionized) sector, density will fall.  Con-
versely, if employment expands in a highly unionized sector or declines in 
one where unionism is absent or weak, density will rise.  Moreover, labor 
market churning is an inherent feature of market economies, with new jobs 
constantly being created and old ones being destroyed.  Those dynamics, 
along with labor turnover and (in the U.S. case) steady population growth, 
means that simply to maintain union density at a given level can require a 
great deal of new organizing; to increase density requires even more exten-
sive effort.  Yet in the face of an increasingly hostile institutional environ-
ment, most U.S. unions have concentrated on defending their past gains, 
rather than new organizing. 
Indeed, as employers increasingly undermined their effectiveness, the 
number of NLRB union elections fell sharply starting in the mid-1970s, as 
Figure 5 shows.  Unions also have developed a more selective approach to 
organizing under the NLRA, so that while there were fewer elections, un-
ions won a higher proportion of them, a trend that began gradually in the 
1980s and 1990s and accelerated in the 21st century.  In this period, many 
unions came to believe that they could organize more successfully outside 
the increasingly dysfunctional NLRA system than within it, and thus turned 
their energies to pressuring employers directly for recognition rather than 
petitioning for an NLRB election. 
 25.  Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to 
Organizing 2-3 (Econ. Policy Inst. Briefing Paper No. 235, 2009), https://www.epi.org/publication 
/bp235/.  
 26.  Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the 
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Figure 5.  NLRB Representation Elections and Win Rates, 1973-
2014.27
Union decline not only led to growing asymmetry in the power of em-
ployers and workers, but also contributed to the growth in inequality since 
the 1970s, as Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld have shown.28 Union 
members have higher earnings, on average, and also are far more likely to 
have employer-provided health insurance and pension benefits than their 
non-union counterparts. As Figure 6 shows, whereas for the first three dec-
ades after World War II average employee compensation kept pace with 
productivity in the United States, starting in the mid-1970s compensation 
stagnated even as productivity continued to rise.29
In the same period, union power was also reduced by deregulation in 
industries like airlines, trucking and telecommunications, leading to grow-
ing competition from nonunion firms and increasing employer efforts to 
reduce wages, benefits, and labor standards.30  A simultaneous surge in 
outsourcing (not only shifting production to other countries, but also sub-
contracting within the United States) increasingly transferred market risk 
and accountability from large corporations to smaller enterprises.31  This 
frequently meant that jobs moved from union to nonunion firms, a shift 
 27.  Ruth Milkman & Stephanie Luce, Labor Unions and the Great Recession, 3 RUSSELL SAGE 
FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 145, 150 (2017), https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/rsfjss/3/3/145.full.pdf. 
 28.  See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality,
76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513-37 (2011).  
29. The Productivity-Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 2019), https://secure.epi.org/productivity-
pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/Z6GS-8Y4N]. 
 30.  See generally Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization, 58
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 335 (2005).  
 31.  DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND 
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typically accompanied by wage and benefit reductions.32  In addition, a 
growing number of companies subcontracted tasks directly to workers 
themselves, many of whom were thereby transformed from employees to 
“independent contractors” – so that they were no longer protected by the 
NLRA or by minimum wage and other employment laws.33
Figure 6.  Productivity Growth and Hourly Compensation, United 
States, 1948-2018.34
This was part of what Jacob Hacker famously called the “great risk 
shift” from firms to individuals.35 At first it disproportionately affected 
non-college-educated workers, but by the turn of the 21st century employ-
ment insecurity and other forms of economic precarity had expanded to 
include many mid-level workers as well as professionals.  Starting in the 
late 1970s, defined-benefit pensions, once a standard feature of employ-
ment in large companies, were increasingly replaced by defined-
contribution schemes, many of them voluntary36; employers also trans-
ferred more health insurance costs to employees.37
 32.  Id. at 254. 
 33.  Id. at 21. 
      34.    The Productivity-Pay Gap, supra note 29. 
 35.  JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2006).  
 36.  Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Historical Tables and Graphs, 
1975-2017, U.S. DEP’T LAB. 10 (Sept. 2019), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/researchers 
/statistics/retirement-bulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletin-historical-tables-and-graphs.pdf. 
 37.  Ken-Hou Lin, Samuel Bondurant & Andrew Messamore, Union, Premium Cost, and the 
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Even in private-sector industries where unions maintained a foothold, 
their power and influence grew weaker in the late 20th century.  Industry-
wide “pattern bargaining” was deeply eroded, and indeed eliminated entire-
ly in some industries, starting in the 1970s.38  In the mid-20th century, when 
strong industry-wide unions were able to “take wages out of competition,” 
firms gained market share by offering their customers higher productivity 
or quality than their competitors, rather than by squeezing labor.39  But in 
the late 20th and early 21st century, as both unionism and regulation weak-
ened, more and more firms reverted to the pre-New Deal pattern of compet-
ing by cutting wages and benefits.40
II. THE WANING POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF U.S. UNIONS
The decline in union density gradually reduced the political influence 
of American unions. Voters in union households have continued to vote 
disproportionately for Democrats, although with falling union density, the 
share of the total vote comprised of union household voters has dropped, 
from about 26 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2016.41  Nevertheless, as 
Taylor Dark has shown, organized labor’s political alliance with the Demo-
cratic party has remained intact, and unions continue to have substantial 
political clout in some key arenas.42
At the same time, repeated efforts to reform the NLRA to create a 
more level playing field between employers and unions have failed, even 
under Democratic administrations – most recently with the unsuccessful 
campaign for the Employee Free Choice Act, which was finally abandoned 
in 2009.  At the state level, moreover, “right to work” laws prohibiting 
union shops, which had first proliferated after the passage of the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act in the South and Southwest, recently began to spread more 
 38.  Thomas A. Kochan & Christine A. Riordan, Employment Relations and Growing Income 
Inequality: Causes and Potential Options for its Reversal, 58 J. INDUS. REL. 420, 425-26 (Apr. 19, 
2016). 
 39.  Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U.
PENN. L. REV. 581, 584 (2007). 
 40.  See id. at 581, 584-85, 629. 
 41.  Kim Moody, Who Put Trump in the White House?, JACOBIN MAG. (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/trump-election-democrats-gop-clinton-whites-workers-rust-belt/ 
[https://perma.cc/6WNQ-ESWK]. 
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widely.43  At this writing such laws are in effect in a majority of the fifty 
states, including former union strongholds like Michigan and Wisconsin.44
In the 21st century, conservatives launched systematic efforts to repli-
cate the disempowerment of private-sector unions in the public sector, 
where unions, as noted earlier, have been largely unaffected by the forces 
generating private-sector de-unionization.  Public-sector unions retained 
large treasuries and regularly provided financial support to Democratic 
candidates.  That made them prime targets for conservative organizations 
like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which developed 
model legislation designed to undermine public-sector collective bargain-
ing at the state level, which it disseminated widely to sympathetic Republi-
can politicians.45  When the 2010 mid-term elections swept Republicans 
into power in several key states, they were well prepared to launch direct 
attacks on public-sector collective bargaining.  In some states where that 
took place – most notably Wisconsin – the result was a sharp decline in 
public-sector union density, as Figure 7 shows.   
Ironically, Wisconsin had been the first state in the nation to pass leg-
islation creating collective bargaining rights for public-sector workers, in 
1959.46  Half a century later, it became the site of an unprecedented state-
level political attack on those rights.  Newly elected Governor Scott Walker 
proposed a new public-sector collective-bargaining law for the state in 
early 2011, which he promoted in the name of budget deficit reduction.47
This had genuine appeal in the aftermath of the Great Recession which had 
put a great strain on government resources.  The bill closely resembled 
model legislation promoted by ALEC, in which Walker himself had been 
active.  Although it sparked vigorous resistance and a dramatic political 
struggle — including a months-long occupation of the state legislative 
chamber — Walker ultimately prevailed. 
Wisconsin’s new law narrowed the scope of public-sector collective 
bargaining and banned the collection of “agency fees” to cover the costs of 
union representation.48  This longstanding practice had been predicated on 
the legal requirement that public-sector unions represent all workers cov-
 43.  GREENHOUSE, supra note 1, at 205. 
 44.  Right to Work States, LEGAL DEF. FOUND., https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y73G-K3WF] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
 45.  See generally ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE: HOW CONSERVATIVE
ACTIVISTS, BIG BUSINESSES AND WEALTHY DONORS RESHAPED THE AMERICAN STATES – AND THE 
NATION (2019); GORDON LAFER, THE ONE PERCENT SOLUTION (2017). 
 46.  GREENHOUSE, supra note 1, at 188. 
 47.  Id. at 182-94. 
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ered by their collective bargaining agreements, whether or not those work-
ers had joined as dues-paying members.  In 2017, Iowa passed an even 
more draconian law restricting public-sector unions, again with ALEC’s 
support.49
The following year, conservative anti-union forces also had a major 
victory on the national level, when the U.S. Supreme Court’s Janus v. 
AFSCME decision reversed a decades-long precedent (the Court’s 1977 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education decision), and barred all public-sector 
unions across the nation from collecting agency fees, as 22 states did at the 
time.50  Although the Wisconsin-scale decline in public-sector union mem-
bership that some commentators predicted has not yet materialized, there 
has been some erosion.51  On the other hand, there are signs of union re-
newal in this sector, as manifested in the wave of teachers’ strikes in 2018 
and 2019, discussed below, and in efforts on the part of  many public-sector 
union leaders to communicate more effectively with their members. 
Figure 7.  Public-Sector Union Density in Wisconsin, 2006-2017.52
 49.  HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 45, at 108. 
 50.  Id. at 108-09, 195. 
 51.  Robert Lafolla, Mass Exodus of Public Union Fee Payers After High Court Ruling, DAILY
LAB. REP. (Apr. 5, 2019, 3:10 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/mass-exodus-of-
public-union-fee-payers-after-high-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/XK8U-UWBT]. 
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III. VARIETIES OF UNIONISM: THE REVITALIZATION OF FORMER AFL
AFFILIATES
The decline in union density and power since the 1970s has been une-
ven, affecting some types of labor organizations far more than others.  Not 
only have private-sector unions declined far more than their public-sector 
counterparts to date, but also there are substantial variations within the 
private sector.  In general, the unions that declined the most sharply were 
those formerly affiliated with the independent Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations (CIO), prior to that body’s 1955 merger with the much older 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) to form the AFL-CIO.53  The former 
CIO unions were largely based in manufacturing, which shrank dramatical-
ly in the late 20th century, both because of growing capital flight to regions 
of the world with low labor costs and because of technological shifts that 
led to reduced manufacturing employment worldwide.  In contrast, most 
former AFL unions were in place-bound sectors like services, transporta-
tion and construction, which also tend to be less affected by technological 
change.  In addition, the former AFL affiliates were typically structured as 
occupational unions, which as Dorothy Sue Cobble has argued, was a com-
parative advantage in the post-industrial economy.  Such unions were well 
suited to workers who shifted frequently across firms and work sites (as in 
the construction trades), a situation that became more widespread with de-
industrialization.54
Another crucial difference between the former AFL and CIO unions 
was that the latter had first formed in the crucible of the NLRA and the 
larger New Deal regulatory order, which meant that their entire strategic 
repertoire reflected that context.  That had served them well in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and in the immediate postwar period.  But starting in the late 
1970s it began to limit their capacity to adapt to the changed conditions of 
the neoliberal era.  The former CIO unions were not only disproportionate-
ly affected by outsourcing, but also by employers’ successful efforts to 
undermine the NLRA.  In contrast, many of the former AFL affiliates had a 
broader strategic repertoire to draw on, a repertoire that included non-
NLRA approaches to organizing, reflecting a historical legacy rooted in 
pre-New Deal conditions. 
 53.  See Ruth Milkman, Back to the Future: U.S. Labour in the New Gilded Age, 51 BRIT. J.
INDUS. REL. 645, 653-55 (2013); RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE U.S. LABOR MOVEMENT 23-24 (2006) [hereinafter MILKMAN, L.A. STORY]. 
 54.  See generally Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Post-Industrial Workforce: Lessons from 
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The former AFL affiliates were by no means immune to the anti-union 
campaigns that employers unleashed starting in the 1970s; indeed, union 
density fell in construction and other former AFL jurisdictions nearly as 
much as it did in manufacturing during that period.55  But the unions with 
historical roots in the AFL were better equipped than the former CIO affili-
ates to respond to the changes that unfolded in the neoliberal era.  Many of 
the AFL unions fell back on traditional tactics designed to exert direct pres-
sure on employers to win recognition, a longstanding approach that re-
mained in the toolkit of these unions throughout the New Deal era.  In the 
construction industry, with its unstable and ever-changing workplaces, the 
NLRA had never functioned particularly well, and thus the building trade 
unions had continued to use pre-New Deal organizing approaches through-
out the 20th century.  Unions like the Service Employees International Un-
ion (SEIU) and the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (now UNITE HERE), 
also did so at times, giving them more room to maneuver than the former 
CIO affiliates when conditions changed starting in the late 1970s. 
The former AFL affiliates were also the unions that devoted the most 
extensive resources to organizing the unorganized in the late 1990s, when 
former SEIU President John Sweeney was elected to head the AFL-CIO.  
Indeed, of the seven unions that left the AFL-CIO to form the “Change to 
Win” (CTW) federation in 2005, in response to a call to restructure the 
labor movement, all but one were former AFL affiliates: the Teamsters, the 
Laborers, the Carpenters, the United Food and Commercial Workers 
(UFCW), as well as SEIU and UNITE HERE. The only exception was the 
tiny United Farm Workers, whose roots were in neither the AFL nor the 
CIO, since it formed in the 1960s.56  Some of these unions later left CTW 
and rejoined the AFL-CIO, but the CTW did reflect the comparative ad-
vantage these former AFL unions enjoyed in recent decades.  Still, even 
these unions found it increasingly difficult to justify the vast outlay of re-
sources required for successful new organizing.57
IV. “ALT-LABOR”: WORKER CENTERS, THE FIGHT FOR $15, STATE 
AND LOCAL LEGISLATION, AND WAGE BOARDS
As traditional forms of unionism became increasingly difficult to sus-
tain, a problem aggravated by the ongoing spread of subcontracting and 
 55.  MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 121-25, 
192 (1989). 
 56.  MILKMAN, L.A. STORY, supra note 53, at 190-91. 
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other forms of employment restructuring, alternative forms of labor organi-
zation began to emerge, especially among low-wage and foreign-born 
workers.  Starting in the 1990, “worker centers” (the most common type of 
“alt-labor” organization) began to proliferate – some incubated by unions 
and others launched by independent activists who were skeptical about the 
relevance of conventional unionism for workers at the bottom of the labor 
market.  Many of the centers focused on organizing and advocacy for 
workers excluded from NLRA protection, like day laborers or taxi drivers 
who are classified as independent contractors.  Others organized workers 
who had never successfully unionized on a significant scale, like domestic 
workers.  Still other centers were sited in sectors where unions had once 
existed but had nearly disappeared, like restaurant work or garment manu-
facturing, and a few organized along ethnic or racial lines.  In 1992, there 
were only four worker centers in the United States, but by 2003 their num-
bers had grown to 137.58  In 2018, the latest estimate available at this writ-
ing, there were 226; and by then several centers had banded together into 
national networks or organizations.59
Worker centers are typically modest in size, with limited staff and 
funding.60  Despite that limitation, they often manage to mount highly visi-
ble and successful campaigns “naming and shaming” employers who vio-
late labor and employment laws.61 Unconstrained by the strictures of the 
NLRA, and by many of the other challenges that conventional unions face, 
they are flexible organizations that have perfected the science of filing 
complaints about workplace violations with government agencies and initi-
ating lawsuits against employers, often winning substantial monetary set-
tlements.62  They are equally effective at constructing compelling 
narratives about struggles for economic justice, drawing public and media 
attention to the plight of precarious low-wage workers.63  Worker centers 
have successfully campaigned for legislation strengthening penalties for 
workplace violations and laws granting additional rights to low-wage 
workers; a few have partnered with unions to win collective bargaining 
rights for specific groups of workers.64  Worker centers also engage in 
 58.  FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 14. 
 59.  Janice Fine et al., Understanding Worker Center Trajectories, in NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL:
WORKER ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND MOVEMENT IN A NEW ECONOMIC AGE 13 (Janice Fine et al. 
eds., 2018).  
60.   FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 14, at 14, 217-18. 
 61. NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT 16 (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014). 
62.   Id. at 19. 
63.   Id. at 16. 
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grassroots organizing, to the extent their resources permit.  They recruit 
workers by providing legal services and/or offering educational opportuni-
ties.65 Although maintaining engagement from those who receive such 
services after their immediate needs are met is often challenging, most 
centers promote leadership development and other forms of empowerment 
for their constituents.66  These organizations are typically led by highly 
educated professionals – lawyers or individuals with other specialized 
training – often female.67  That facilitates alliances with other political ac-
tors, including elected officials and faith leaders, and in some cases middle-
class consumers as well.68
In many respects, worker centers have reproduced the organizational 
strategies developed by earlier generations of advocates for low-wage im-
migrant workers in the Progressive era, although few worker center leaders 
are aware of having done so.  Settlement houses and labor reform groups 
like the Women’s Trade Union League similarly exposed sweatshops and 
employer abuses; campaigned for protective legislation; promoted unioni-
zation; and offered social, legal, and educational services to low-wage im-
migrants.69  Just as these organizations did in the past, most worker centers 
today rely heavily on philanthropy.70
Most traditional unionists were initially skeptical about this mode of 
organizing when it first emerged in the 1990s, but over time they came to 
appreciate the worker centers’ efforts.  Eventually some unions replicated 
alt-labor tactics and strategies in their own organizing campaigns among 
low-wage workers.  Examples include the UFCW’s “OUR (Organization 
United for Respect) Walmart” campaign and the SEIU’s effort to organize 
fast-food workers, launched in 2012, the “Fight for $15” – so named be-
cause of its demands for hourly wages of $15 as well as a union for fast 
food workers.71
65.   Fine, Worker Centers, supra note 14, at 2, 12. 
66.   Id. at 13. 
67.   Steve Jenkins, Organizing, Advocacy, and Member Power, 6 WORKINGUSA 56, 61, 86 
(2002). 
 68.  FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 14, at 14. 
 69.  See generally MAUREEN FLANAGAN, SEEING WITH THEIR HEARTS: CHICAGO WOMEN AND 
THE VISION OF THE GOOD CITY, 1871-1933 (2002); SHELDON STROMQUIST, REINVENTING “THE 
PEOPLE”: THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, THE CLASS PROBLEM AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
LIBERALISM (2006). 
 70.  See supra note 69. 
 71.  See generally ADAM REICH & PETER BEARMAN, WORKING FOR RESPECT: COMMUNITY AND 
CONFLICT AT WALMART (2018); DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR $15: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING 
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Although unionization has yet to be achieved in this industry, the 
Fight for $15  campaign did win $15 per hour for fast food workers in some 
jurisdictions, and also helped spur a raft of successful efforts to increase the 
minimum wage for all workers in several cities, counties and states to $15 
per hour (phased in over several years).  SEIU and UNITE HERE have also 
won pay increases for specific groups of workers, such as those employed 
in airports or in hotels, by means of local government ordinances or laws, 
or in some cases through referenda.72  In an era of growing public concern 
about growing economic inequality, these issues enjoy broad popular sup-
port and have steadily gained momentum at the state and local level. 
These efforts to win higher minimum wages at the state and local level 
have been highly effective in improving the situation of private-sector low-
wage workers.  The National Employment Law Project (NELP) estimated 
that from 2012 to 2018, the Fight for $15 and related campaigns won im-
proved pay for 22 million U.S. workers, through a combination of state and 
local minimum wage legislation and employers raising their minimum pay 
scales in response to public pressure.73 NELP estimates the total value of 
these raises at $68 billion (in 2018 dollars) in additional annual income, 
once the approved increases are fully phased in.74
Other types of pro-worker legislation have also proliferated in the 21st
century.  Between 2006 and May 2019, ten states, twenty cities and three 
counties enacted paid sick days laws.75  Since 2002, when California estab-
lished the nation’s first paid family leave insurance program, seven other 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar laws.76  In addi-
tion, nine states and the city of Seattle have passed Domestic Workers’ 
Bills of Rights, starting with New York in 2010.77  State and local laws 
stiffening penalties for minimum wage violations and other forms of “wage 
 72.  Nelson D. Schwartz, Push to Raise the Minimum Wage Goes Local, at Airports and Hotels,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/business/economy/minimum-
wage.html [https://perma.cc/S6H8-JCG2]. 
 73.  Impact of the Fight for $15: $68 Billion in Raises, 22 Million Workers, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT (Nov. 2018), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Data-Brief-Impact-Fight-for-15-
2018.pdf. 
74.  Id. 
 75.  Fact Sheet: Current Paid Sick Days Laws, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES
(May 2019), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/paid-sick-
days/current-paid-sick-days-laws.pdf. 
76. State Paid Family and Medical Leave Insurance Laws, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES (Aug. 2019), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/paid-
leave/state-paid-family-leave-laws.pdf. 
 77.  Alexia Fernandez-Campbell, Kamala Harris Just Introduced A Bill to Give Housekeepers 
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theft” have also been enacted in some jurisdictions, and a few have passed 
laws regulating employers’ scheduling practices.78  In yet another example 
of the parallels between the pre-New Deal era and the years since the mid-
1970s, these campaigns are reminiscent of labor reformers’ efforts to win 
state and local protective labor legislation in the early 20th century. 
A feature of many state minimum wage laws enacted in the early 20th
century that has attracted widespread interest among unionists and progres-
sive labor advocates in recent years is the wage board, a mechanism de-
signed to generate wage increases (and in some cases regulation of hours 
and/or working conditions) in specific industries.  Such boards operated in 
a variety of jurisdictions in the first half of the 20th century, but then faded 
into obscurity in the post-World War II years, when unions relied on col-
lective bargaining to address such issues.  But wage boards gained renewed 
attention after 2015, when the Fight for $15 persuaded New York State’s 
labor commissioner to convene a wage board for the fast food restaurant 
industry.  This tripartite panel (with representatives from labor, business 
and the public) then issued a recommendation to raise the minimum wage 
of most fast food workers in the State to $15 per hour, phased in over a 
period of several years.79
Wage boards are one form of sectoral bargaining, an alternative 
framework for labor law that several recent commentators have promoted 
as a replacement for the broken NLRA system.  Advocates of this ap-
proach, including the Center for American Progress and the Harvard 
“Clean Slate for Worker Power” project, argue that the NLRA has become 
so dysfunctional that its resuscitation is no longer possible.80  They propose 
instead establishing a national system of wage boards that bring together 
employers, workers and the public to negotiate wages and benefits for en-
tire sectors or industries.81  Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren were 
 78.  See generally Marc Doussard & Ahmad Gamal, The Rise of Wage Theft Laws: Can Commu-
nity–Labor Coalitions Win Victories in State Houses? 52 URB. AFF. REV. 780 (2016); Amanda Miggo, 
The Secure Scheduling Movement: Why Every State Should Consider Enacting Secure Scheduling 
Legislation, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 155 (2019). 
 79.  Andrias, supra note 71. 
 80.  Clean Slate for Worker Power, HARV. L. SCH., https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/clean-slate-project 
[https://perma.cc/8GMP-QNUE] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019); David Madland, Wage Boards for Ameri-
can Workers: Industry-Level Collective Bargaining for All Workers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 9, 
2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/04/09/448515/wage-boards-
american-workers/ [https://perma.cc/V75Y-SHJJ]. 
 81.  Noam Scheiber, Candidates Grow Bolder on Labor, and Not Just Bernie Sanders, N.Y.
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among the 2020 Democratic presidential candidates who endorsed this 
idea.82
As Kate Andrias has observed, sectoral bargaining is not new, rather it 
is “a reinterpretation of principles advanced by earlier incarnations of the 
American labor movement.”83 Indeed, it is another aspect of the contempo-
rary labor landscape that recuperates strategies developed in the pre-New 
Deal era (although wage boards were also used in the 1930s and 1940s).  
The first state law with a wage board provision dates back to 1912, in Mas-
sachusetts.84  The New York statute authorizing the labor commissioner to 
convene such wage boards dates back to 1933 (but in response to employer 
pressure, the new minimum wage law the state enacted in 2016 included a 
provision eliminating this option).85  Wage boards are regularly used in 
other countries, notably Australia, and other forms of sectoral bargaining 
are commonplace in Western Europe.86  But apart from the 2015 New York 
fast food case, its revival in the United States is largely aspirational.  Cali-
fornia, Colorado, and New Jersey do have laws on the books that authorize 
the appointment of wage boards with representation from labor, employers, 
and the public, but the California labor commission was defunded in 2004 
and Colorado’s also has been moribund for years.87
In short, faced with the increasing dysfunction of the NLRA system, 
the U.S. labor movement has experimented with a variety of alternatives to 
conventional unionism, from worker centers, to state and local labor legis-
lation, and to sectoral bargaining.  All of these approaches have analogues 
in the pre-New Deal era.  Yet traditional unionism has not entirely disap-
peared. 
V. MILLENNIAL-GENERATION UNIONISM AND THE 2018-19 STRIKES
The dysfunction of the NLRA system long predates the election of 
President Donald Trump, although his administration has made the situa-
tion even worse.88  More than a decade before the 2016 election, however, 
 82.  Id.
 83.  Andrias, supra note 71, at 10. 
 84.  Mike Vilensky, New York Wage Boards Shaped Policy for Decades, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-wage-boards-shaped-policy-for-decades-1438909257 
[https://perma.cc/8BLS-7Y4V]; Frank T. de Vyver, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938, 6 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 327 (1939); Andrias, supra note 71, at 53, 65.  
 85.  Andrias, supra note 71, at 84.  
 86.  Id. at 84-85. 
 87.  Id.
 88.  Celene McNicholas et al., Unprecedented: The Trump NLRB’s Attack on Workers’ Rights,
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Harvard labor economist Richard B. Freeman declared, “If they were an 
animal or plant, private-sector unions would fall on the endangered species 
list of the US Fish and Wildlife Service.”89 That is the conventional wis-
dom among 21st century labor scholars, and goes a long way toward ex-
plaining the experimentation with alternative organizational forms and 
labor strategies discussed in the previous section. 
Yet traditional forms of unionism have also resurfaced in the 2010s, 
sparked by a new political generation that emerged as the Occupy Wall 
Street (OWS) movement catapulted the issue of inequality onto the public 
agenda.90  The Fight for $15 itself began in New York City as an indirect 
offshoot of OWS, and some of the college-educated Millennials who par-
ticipated in OWS and movements like Black Lives Matter went on to be-
come union activists and organizers.91
Unionization rates are lower among young workers than older ones.  
In 2018, 4.4% of those aged sixteen to twenty-four were union members, 
compared to 13.6% of those aged fifty-five or more.92  That disparity re-
flects both the limited extent of recent organizing among new labor market 
entrants and the fact that the higher earnings and greater job security avail-
able in unionized jobs reduce turnover relative to nonunion jobs, so that 
workers tend to age in place.  But recent surveys suggest that the age gap in 
unionization rates is not reflected in attitudes.  A 2015 Pew Research Cen-
ter survey found that 55% of respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine 
viewed labor unions favorably, while only 29% viewed them unfavorably; 
in contrast 46% of older respondents viewed unions favorably, and a simi-
lar share unfavorably.93
Reflecting these attitudes, young workers, especially highly educated 
young workers, have been actively unionizing in recent years.  In 2017, 
when union membership grew modestly over the year before, workers un-
der age thirty-five (who are less than 40% of the labor force) accounted for 
 89.  Richard B. Freeman, The Road to Union Renaissance in the United States, in THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 3 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004)  
 90.  See Ruth Milkman, A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of 
Protest, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (2017). 
 91.  See J. Mijin Cha, Jane Holgate & Karel Yon, Emerging Cultures of Activism: Young People 
and the Building of Alliances Between Unions and Other Social Movements, 45 WORK & OCCUPATIONS
451, 461-74 (2018). 
 92.  Hirsch & MacPherson, supra note 19.  
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three-quarters of the increase in membership.94  In the private sector, jour-
nalists and adjunct college faculty stand out as examples of this trend.  
After digital journalists at Gawker unionized in 2015, a slew of additional 
digital news outlets voted to form unions, including Salon, Vice Media, 
Huffpost, the Guardian, Thrillist, Mic, Thinkprogress, Slate and Gothamist 
(although both Gawker and Gothamist were shut down soon after their 
workers voted to unionize).95  In all these settings the organizing was led 
by younger journalists. “This generation is tired of hearing that this indus-
try requires martyrdom,” a NewsGuild union staffer explained, “that it 
requires that you suck it up, that you accept low wages and long hours.”96
Journalists at print publications (often more diverse in regard to age) have 
followed suit, including The New Yorker, The New Republic and New York 
magazines as well as the famously anti-union Los Angeles Times.97
Non-tenure-track faculty members at private colleges – another sector 
dominated by highly-educated young workers – have also joined unions in 
large numbers in recent years.  In the first three-quarters of 2016 alone, the 
NLRB certified twenty new bargaining units at private colleges.  Most of 
them are represented by the SEIU, whose “Faculty Forward” campaign has 
successfully organized 54,000 adjunct faculty members on more than 60 
campuses.98  Graduate student workers have also voted to unionize at many 
universities in recent years, although their right to do so in the private sec-
tor has been hotly contested; in 2019 the Trump-appointed NLRB reversed 
an earlier ruling that had they were eligible to form unions.99  In another 
high-profile example of collective action among highly-educated young 
workers,  an estimated 20,000 Google workers walked off their jobs to 
 94.  John Schmitt, Biggest Gains in Union Membership in 2017 Were for Younger Workers,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/biggest-gains-in-union-
membership-in-2017-were-for-younger-workers/ [https://perma.cc/H9W8-A2AP]. 
 95.  Id.
 96.  Steven Greenhouse, Why Newsrooms are Unionizing Now, NIEMANREPORTS (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://niemanreports.org/articles/why-newsrooms-are-unionizing-now/ [https://perma.cc/2RV2-8GT7]. 
 97.  Id.
 98.  William A. Herbert, The Winds of Change Shift: An Analysis of Recent Growth in Bargaining 
Units and Representation Efforts in Higher Education, 8 J. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACAD. 1, 6 
(2016); see also Frequently Asked Questions, SEIU FACULTY FORWARD
http://seiufacultyforward.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/D9W6-UTUN] (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2020). 
 99.  David Yaffe-Bellany, Graduate Students, After Gains in Union Efforts, Face a Federal 
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protest the management’s handling of sexual harassment claims in Novem-
ber 2018, although this did not involve a unionization effort.100
By far the most dramatic manifestation of unionization among this 
new generation of college-educated Millennials, however, was the massive 
wave of teachers’ strikes in 2018.  Teachers from many age groups partici-
pated, but the leaders were consistently youthful, mostly in their late 20s, 
and some had a history of activism in OWS or other Millennial-dominated 
political groups.101  The first teachers’ strike of 2018 was in West Virginia, 
where public-sector unions lack collective bargaining rights and where 
strikes are illegal.102  As befitting the leadership’s youthful profile, the 
organizing effort began online, through a closed Facebook group; strike 
support funds also were solicited online via GoFundMe.103  The spectacular 
success of the West Virginia strike soon inspired a series of walkouts 
among teachers in Oklahoma, Arizona, Kentucky, North Carolina, and 
Colorado.104 These were followed in 2019 by additional teachers’ strikes in 
cities where unions were long established, namely Los Angeles, Oakland 
and Chicago.105
Even though some of the 2018 teachers’ strikes were nominally ille-
gal, they won extensive support among parents and other community mem-
bers, and in some cases among school administrators.  These were public-
sector strikes, in which as noted earlier, unions typically face far less em-
ployer opposition than in private-sector settings.  However, in 2018 and 
2019 a number of large strikes broke out in the private sector as well, 
among hotel workers, auto workers, and others, some of which proved 
highly successful.  The 2018 UNITE HERE strike against Marriott, for 
example, which involved nearly 8,000 workers spread across eight major 
cities, won raises for hotel housekeepers as high as 40%, phased in over 
four years, along with improvements in pensions.106
 100.  Daisuke Wakbayashi et al., Google Walkout: Employees Stage Protest Over Handling of 
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology 
/google-walkout-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/QZK5-F7XM]. 
 101.  ERIC BLANC, RED STATE REVOLT: THE TEACHERS’ STRIKE WAVE AND WORKING-CLASS 
POLITICS 63, 104-09, 169-71 (2019). 
 102.  Id. at 36, 38.  
 103.  Id. at 11, 74, 113-15. 
 104.  Id. at 5, 13.  
 105.  Howard Blume & Sonali Kohli, The Teachers’ Strike Gripped LA for 6 Days. A Year Later, 
What are the Results?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-
21/legacy-of-los-angeles-teachers-strike [https://perma.cc/DN62-AN25]. 
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Whether this wave of strikes signals a reversal of the decline in work 
stoppages shown in Figure 2 remains to be seen, but it does suggest that 
recent obituaries for traditional forms of workers’ collective action are 
premature.  Public outrage over growing inequality and the emergence of a 
new generation of progressive activists may yet breathe new life into the 
nation’s unions, even as experimentation continues with alternative ave-
nues to advance the interests of working people. 
